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REFORM IN LIGHT OF THE INSURANCE CRISIS:
INVESTMENT INCOME AND FEDERAL
REGULATION VERSUS PROFIT ALLOWANCE AND
STATE REGULATION
INTRODUCTION
Property and casualty insurance companies primarily operate to insure
individuals and commercial enterprises against losses arising out of legal
liability for injuries to other persons.' Additionally, property and casualty
insurers serve as important institutional investors, providing the U.S.
economy with large amounts of capital. In 1984 alone, property and
casualty insurers invested $195 billion, or seventy-four percent of their
assets, to stimulate economic growth. 2 Consequently, insurance companies
(in conjuction with pension funds) ate second only to thrift institutions
as a source of capital in the U.S. economy.3
Policyholders' premium surpluses, unearned premium reserves and
loss reserves provide insurance companies with a large amount of invest-
ment capital.4 In return for premiums received, insurers promise to in-
demnify their policyholders for costs derived from the occurrence of a
specified event or accident. 5 Insurance companies must be able to fulfill
this contractual obligation. Therefore, the financial solvency of the insurer
must be assured. 6 When investing capital derived from premiums entrusted
to it by its policyholders, the primary concern of insurance companies
should be the safety of the principal with the maximum yield consistent
with such safety. This requires that an insurance company's capital should
be secured by investing in relatively low risk and, consequently, low yield
securities .7
1. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 2 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT 783-84 (1971).
2. See INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, INSURANCE FACTS: 1985-1986 PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
FACT BOOK 1 (1985) (the other 26% of their assets was in office space, equipment, supplies and
cash).
3. Estimated amounts for 1983 and projected amounts for 1984 invested by insurance companies
and pension funds were, respectively, $85 billion and $90 billion. Similar investments by thrift
institutions were $85.7 billion and $91.7 billion; investment companies, $39.6 billion and $33.3
billion; mortgage companies and real estate investment trust, $1.2 billion and $1.7 billion;
commercial banks, $34.2 billion and $46.5 billion; government, $13.9 billion and $17.2 billion;
foreign investors, $10.2 billion and $9.5 billion; business corporations, $0.3 billion and $0.2
billion; individuals and other sources, $2.6 billion and $0.3 billion. See BANKERS TRUST COMPANY,
CREDIT AND CAPITAL MARKETS 1984 T-8 (1984).
4. See INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, supra note 2, at 23.
5. See G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDLA OF INSURANCE LAW § 1.2 (R. Anderson 2d ed. 1984).
6. The Supreme Court has dealt with this concern and held that contracts of insurance may be
said to be interdependent. German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 414 (1914).
They cannot be regarded singly, or isolatedly, and the effect of their relation is to create a fund
of assurance and credit. The companies become the depositories of the money of the insured;
thereby they possess great power and are charged with great responsibility. Id.
7. In 1905, the Armstrong Investigation was organized in New York to protect the insurance
industry from reputed dishonesty and bad management. It revealed the inadequacies of insurance
regulation with respect to investments. The Armstrong committee concluded that risk capital or
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Because the paramount obligation of the insurer is to remain finan-
cially solvent so it may fulfill its contractual obligations, practically every
state has laws regulating both the type of securities and the percentage
of assets insurance companies may invest in them.8 Even subject to such
restrictions, insurance investments have reaped tremendous returns since
1979. 9 In recent years, however, insurers began suffering losses from
policy underwriting.' 0 It appears that the inflationary years of the late
1970s and early 1980s, which brought high interest rates, provided insur-
ance companies with a windfall in investment income. This caused insurers
to rely more on investment income than on underwriting gains." In the
1980s, however, with much lower and stable interest rates, the growth of
investment income has slowed to the point where it can no longer cover
underwriting losses.
A result has been the so-called insurance crisis. The crisis is one of
affordability for some risks and availability for others. 2 Insurers claim
that increasing litigation and higher average settlements have forced them
to sharply increase premiums and even stop assuming certain types of
risks. 3 In support of this, insurers point to increasing losses from under-
writing.' 4 Insurance industry critics argue that overabundant investment
returns lulled insurance companies into imprudent underwriting for which
they are now paying the price. 5 One thing is clear: the insurance crisis
has, at least chronologically, followed the leveling off of investment
income. The question remaining is whether the investment income decline
caused the insurance crisis, and if it did, whether the crisis could have
been avoided by better regulation of investment income or better regulation
and methods of setting underwriting premiums.
INVESTMENT INCOME AND THE INSURANCE CRISIS
By relying heavily on investment income, insurers helped pave the
way for the insurance crisis. When inflation of the late 1970s brought on
venture loans were not desirable investments of insurance funds and that safety of principal,
rather than return on principal, should be the primary consideration. See Day, Government
Regulation of Insurance Company Investments, in UNrIVRSITY OF CICAGO CONFERENCE ON
INSURANCE 95, 96 (1954).
8. The investments of an insurance company are the primary responsibility of the state that
chartered the company and the insurance commissioner of that state. W. VANCE, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 43 (B. Anderson 3d ed. 1951).
9. The net investment income for property and casualty insurers for the following years: 1979, $10
billion; 1980, $11 billion; 1981, $13.2 billion; 1982, $14.9 billion; 1983, $18.1. billion; 1984,
$17.6 billion; 1985 (estimated), $22 billion; 1986 (forecast), $25 billion. See U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE, U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK, 1986 § 51-6 (1985).
10. See id. at § 51-6.
11. See Eason, Insurers' Mounting Troubles, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1984, at DI, col. 4.
12. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 9, at § 51-6.
13. See generally The Manufactured Crisis, 51 CONSUMER REP. 544 (1984).
14. Underwriting losses for property and casualty insurers for the following years were: 1979, $1.3
billion; 1980, $3.3 billion; 1981, $6.3 billion; 1982, $10.3 billion; 1983, $13 billion; 1984, $20.5
billion; 1985 (estimated), $20 billion; 1986 (forecast), $22 billion. See INsURLaNCE INFoRaTIoN
INsTITUTE, supra note 2, at 19.
15. See Stewart, The "Tort Reform" Hoax, TRIAL, July 1986, at 89, 92-93.
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high interest rates, insurers realized excessive investment earnings. The
years 1977-79 were so good for insurers that they spawned new insurance
companies seeking their share of the new-found investment income and,
thereby, increased competition. 16 Because of new competitive pressures,
insurers cut premiums below cost, using portions of their investment
earnings to decrease premiums.
1 7
A premium war followed, and policyholders reaped the benefits of
the fierce competition. Some policyholders negotiated premium reductions
of up to twenty-five percent. 8 Expecting to profit from the accelerated
investment income, insurers followed a policy of cash-flow underwriting 19
and aggressively underbid each other. The losses that resulted were more
than compensated for by the windfall of investment income from increas-
ing investment yields. 20
The premium war was also aggravated by the lack of strong price
leadership in the property and casualty insurance industry. With about
3,500 individual companies underwriting property and casualty risks, no
single company controls more than ten percent of the market. 21 In 1981,
with a market share of 3.507o, Aetna Property and Casualty Insurance
Company unilaterally increased its rates and lost 0.5% of its market.
22
Without effective price leadership, insurers were suffering from their own
success.
In recent years, however, inflation has slowed considerably. Conse-
quently, interest rates have dropped, and, in response, investment income
has slowed. But underwriting losses continue.2 3 From 1984 to 1985 alone,
underwriting losses for property and casualty insurers increased by fifteen
percent. 24 Investment income is now inadequate to fill the gap caused by
this underwriting loss. Underwriting losses are so severe that they have
consumed investment income, as well as premium surpluses and reserves.
It is this situation that caused insurers to react by increasing premiums
and refusing to underwrite high risks.
REGULATION OF INVESTMENTS
The insurance industry is subject to regulation by virtue of its being
a business affected with a public interest .2  Although other industries are
16. See generally King & Ehrich, Insurers are Scrambling to Break Their Losing Streak, Bus. WEEK,
Dec. 3, 1984, 144.
17. See J. MAGINN & D. TUTrr.E, MANAGING INVESTMENT PORTFOLIOS 112 (1983).
18. See Price Cutting Bleeds the Casualty Insurers, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 8, 1982, at 88.
19. See Eason, supra note 11, at D1.
20. Investment income was deemed so fruitful that insurers began selling "retroactive insurance,"
whereby an insured could purchase coverage for a risk-event that already had occurred. Insurers
calculated they could invest the premium at high enough interest rates during the usually lengthy
period before the claim would be settled. The MGM Grand Hotel was the first major retroactive
insurance case, which also demonstrated the fallability of the theory. MGM settled most of the
claims within half the expected time, and the settlements were more than double what was
projected.
21. See INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTrrUTE, supra note 2, at 1.
22. See King & Ehrich, supra note 16, at 144.
23. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 9, at § 51-6.
24. See id. at § 51-6 (first-half operating results for property and casualty insurers in 1984 and
1985, respectively; loss of $8.8 billion, loss of $10.2 billion).
25. See generally G. RICHARDS, LAW OF INSURANCE § 39 (W. Freedman 5th ed. 1952); Wilson,
19871
Journal of Legislation
also regulated because of their "public interest, ' 26 insurance historically
has been subject to comparatively tight government control. 27 The reason
for such extensive regulation has been concern for the security of the
policyholders.
A central element of regulation has been the states' power to approve
investments of insurance companies. 2 As early as the nineteenth century,
the investing power of insurance companies has been viewed as central to
the security of policyholders. In Commonwealth v. Vrooman,29 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court focused on the investing operations of insurance
companies when it enumerated the interests of policyholders. The court
said laws regulating the insurance business should ensure the continued
permanency of the custodian of the funds paid by the policyholders
because it is that upon which policyholders depend for indemnification.
The court also noted that regulations should assure the honest and
competent administration of premium funds and prevent the funds from
being divided in ways that would injure policyholders. 0
State regulation of insurance began when state legislatures granted
charters to insurance companies.3 As separate administrative bodies were
formed to specifically oversee the regulation of insurance companies,
investments became the responsibility of the insurance department that
chartered the company.32 The power to invest is a power of a corporation
and "like all powers of a corporation, is subject to regulation and control
by the sovereign state to which the corporation owes its allegiance." 33
The Scope of Regulation
Every state and the District of Columbia have regulations regarding
insurance company investments .1 4 Generally, such laws regulate insurance
investments in several aspects:
Property Affected With A Public Interest, 9 S.C.L. REv. 5 (1935). See also German Alliance
Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914); McCarter v. Fireman's Insurance Co., 74 N.J.
Eq. 372, 73 A. 80 (1909).
26. See Wilson, supra note 25, at 11 (generally identifies commodities and commercial transportation
industries as being affected with a public interest).
27. For discussion of the history of insurance regulation, see R. HENSLEY, COm'ETrrbON, REGULATION,
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN NONLIFE INSURANCE 75-78 (1962); AMERIcAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, FEDERAL-STATE REGULATION OF THE PRICING AND MARKETING OF
INSURANCE 13-22 (P. MacAvoy ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Federal-State Regulation]; G.
RICHARDS, supra note 25, at § 40.
28. See G. RICHARDS, supra note 25, at § 41.
29. 164 Pa. 306, 30 A. 217 (1894).
30. 30 A. at 219.
31. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IssUEs AND NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS IN STATE
REGULATION OF THE INSURANCE BUSINESS: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, ExECuTIvE SUMMARY 3
(1979).
32. See W. Vance, supra note 8, at 43.
33. Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Richman, 292 Ill. App. 261, 11 N.E.2d 126, 129 (1937)
(holding that an insurance company licensed under the Insurance Acts of Illinois has the implied
power to invest its money in mortgages and take security to protect the collection of the money
invested).
34. See J. MINTEL, INSURANCE RATE LITIGATION 3 (1983).
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1) State regulations set out what type of investments are allowed.
Such authorized investments usually include U.S. bonds or securities,
various state, local and municipal bonds and notes, bonds or other
securities of corporations, and, subject to various limitations, real estate. 5
2) State insurance laws usually set qualitative requirements for cer-
tain investments, such as corporate securities. Before bonds or stocks of
a corporation may be purchased by an insurance company, it must be
established that the corporation has had some minimum level of earnings,
has been solvent for five to ten years, or has not defaulted on interest or
loan payments for the past five years.3 6
3) States also require a certain amount of portfolio diversification
by insurance companies. Limitations are placed upon the percentage of
the insurer's admitted assets that may be invested in any one investment. 37
4) With respect to real estate, most states limit the amount that may
be owned by an insurance company. Further, mandatory disposition of
property held for longer than five to ten years is required.38 As for loans
or mortgages, state regulations limit the amount of loan or security of
real property to some fraction of the market value of the collateral. 9
5) Some states have instituted "leeway" or "basket" provisions,
which permit insurers to invest a limited percentage of assets in otherwise
unauthorized investments to establish a safety net for several contingen-
cies. 4° These provisions allow for difference of interpretation in regulations
between the legislature, the state commissioner and insurance companies.
They also deal with sudden changes that could cause authorized invest-
ments to become unauthorized. Third, the provisions permit insurers to
readily take advantage of new and innovative investment opportunities
not yet specifically authorized .41
GOALS OF INSURANCE REGULATION
Reviewing the general types of regulations imposed on the investing
activities of insurers, several objectives of regulation become apparent.
Primarily, investment regulations seek to protect policyholders with reg-
ulations that prevent insurance company management from making spec-
ulative investments.42 This intent is evidenced by the specificity of authorized
investments and the requirements of minimum quality and sufficient
diversification. Second, to reduce vulnerability to sudden shifts in eco-
35. See, e.g., IND. INS. LAWS § 27-1-13-3(b)-(d) (1986). See also Kimball & Denenberg, The Regulation
of Investments, in INSURANCE, GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIAL POLICY: STUDIES IN INSURANCE REG-
ULATION 126, 130-35 (S. Kimball & H. Denenberg eds. 1969).
36. See, e.g., IND. INS. LAWS § 27-1-13-3(b)(7) (1986). See also Kimball & Denenberg, supra note
35, at 133.
37. See, e.g., IND. INS. LAWS § 27-1-13-3(b)(11) (1986) (limiting this type of investment to 10%).
See also Kimball & Denenberg, supra note 35, at 132.
38. See, e.g., IND. INS. LAWS § 27-1-13-3(d) (1986) (does not apply to office property).
39. See, e.g., IND. INS. LAWS § 27-1-13-3(b)(9) (1986) (limiting loan to 75% of market value of
collateral).
40. See Kimball & Denenberg, supra note 35, at 135.
41.t See id.
42. See id. at 127.
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nomic circumstances, insurance regulations seek to stabilize the financial
position of insurers.43 Thus, a limit of ten percent of insurance company
assets as the maximum single investment amount is common. 4
Another objective of investment regulations is the state's interest in
preventing overconcentration of the economic power of insurance com-
panies. 45 Legislatures have prevented insurance companies from controlling
other corporations by making it illegal for them to buy large blocks of
corporate stock. 46
Changes in State Regulatory Efforts
State regulations regarding insurance company investments have
changed over the years. The general trend has been one of loosening
control over investment policy.47 Such liberalization is based largely upon
insurance commissioners' realization that most insurance companies follow
sound investment policy and that previous regulations did more to hinder
than promote investment goals. 4 Further, new investment instruments
have emerged as the U.S. economy has evolved. Legislative changes may
come too slowly, causing insurers to miss prime investment opportunities.
In their zeal to protect the social obligation of insurance companies
to policyholders, legislatures and insurance regulation agencies often over-
look the fact that the insurance companies try to secure and maximize
their capital bases. It is clear that the regulation of insurance investments
had little, if any, role in the insurance crisis. In fact, regardless of already
strict regulations, insurers still have achieved high yields on their invest-
ments. 49 What has not been examined, however, is the proper use of
investment returns in underwriting and the setting of rates.
INVESTMENT INCOME AND RATEMAKING
The insurance business is affected with the public interest to such an
extent that rates may be regulated by law.50 Indeed, all fifty states and
the District of Columbia have adopted various laws and established
executive departments for regulating insurance.5 The aim of such regu-
latory machinery is to protect insureds by securing insurers' solvency and
ability to indemnify policyholders.5 2
43. See id.
44. See, e.g., IND. INS. LAWS § 27-1-13-3(b)(11) (1986). See also Kimball & Denenberg, supra note
35, at 132.
45. See Kimball & Denenberg, supra note 35, at 128.
46. Insurance companies can invest only up to ten percent of their stated assets in a corporation.
See id. at 128. Similarly, legislatures have independent social objectives behind insurance
investment regulations. For example, an exception to the limit applies to real estate investments
to encourage investment in such projects as public low-income housing. See id.
47. See id. at 136.
48. See id.
49. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 9, at § 51-6.
50. German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914).
51. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., IND. INS. LAWS § 27-1-13-3(a)(4) (1986).
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Policyholders have the dual interest that the premiums be high enough
to adequately pay all losses, but not so high that insurance is not
affordable." Rate regulation, by preventing inadequate rates, is an im-
portant aid to helping guarantee insurer solvency. By preventing excessive
rates, it also preserves the affordability of risk protection.1
4
Factors in Insurance Ratemaking
In determining rates, three cost factors are taken into account-the
expected loss, expenses and profit allowance." The expected loss is the
insurer's estimate of the dollar loss that will be realized by the average
insured within a particular risk category. 6 The expense component of the
premium rate is the amount needed to cover the overhead expenses of
the insurer. Such expenses include various production costs, taxes, licenses,
fees and other general administrative expenses.5 7 The allowance-for-profit
factor is designed to provide the insurer with a reasonable profit, as well
as a buffer between expected and actual losses and expenses."8
Price setting, however, is subject to government control in all states.5 9
There are generally two types of state regulation of insurance rates. ° The
first, which was the type originally adopted by most states, is the prior-
approval method. Insurers must obtain approval from state insurance
commissioners under this method before rate changes become effective.
61
Most states still use the prior-approval method. Other states have devel-
oped an open-rating system, whereby rates are set by insurers themselves,
without prior approval of the commissioner. 62 The commissioner, however,
has the power to later rescind excessive rates, subject to an administrative
hearing.6
3
The rate regulatory laws of the states provide only general standards,
according to which the insurance commissioner must evaluate the rates.
53. See R. HENSLEY, supra note27, at 10-11.
54. See Mayerson, Ensuring the Solvency of Property and Liability Insurance Companies, in
INSURANCE, GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIAL POLICY, 188 (S. Kimball & H. Denenberg eds. 1969);
FEDERAL-STATE REGULATION, supra note 27, at 33; J. MINTEL, supra note 34, at 2.
55. See AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR PROPERTY AND LIABILITY UNDERWRITERS, 1 PRINCIPLES OF RISK
MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 127-28 (1978).
56. The expected loss is determined from statistics compiled for previous years, which are subject
to further considerations of accuracy, credibility, length of experience period, and trends and
loss development factors. For a discussion of the interplay of those factors and judicial response
to them, see J. MINTEL, supra note 34, at 162-70.
A common misconception of ratemaking is simplification to a comparison between losses paid
in one year to premiums written that same year. See J. MINTEL, supra note 34, at 161.
57. See id. at 172.
58. See AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR PROPERTY AND LIABILITY UNDERWRITERS, supra note 55, at 128.
59. McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1982). The Act gave the states until
January 1, 1948, to institute regulation dealing with the insurance industry. After January 1,
1948, federal antitrust laws became applicable to the insurance industry in areas that were not
yet regulated by state law. Every state has pursued statutes that, effectively, remove the matter
of insurance regulation from federal control under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
60. A third type of ratemaking followed by some states left it up to the state insurance commissioner
to set insurance rates. See FEDERAL-STATE REGULATION, supra note 27, at 17.
61. See Sudden Riches For Casualty Insurers, Bus. WEEK, May 1, 1978, at 66, 68.




Rate laws prohibit insurance rates that are excessive, inadequate or dis-
criminatory. 64 It is under the "excessive" standard that recent pressure to
include investment income in determining rates has been brought. 65
Profit Allowance in Ratemaking
Because of the recent acceleration of investment income returns,
consumer groups have asked legislatures to have income from all sources
considered in establishing rate levels. 66 Specifically, the trend has been to
require investment income to be used in determining the appropriate profit
allowance. Traditionally, profit allowance provisions were established to
protect the insurers. Property and casualty insurance is a unique business;
the ultimate cost of their product (the insurance policy) cannot be deter-
mined until after the policy has ended. Thus, because insurers provide a
socially useful service, and because a large element of chance is inherent
in the pricing of insurance coverage, a guaranteed profit is calculated into
the premium level.
67
In 1921, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners intro-
duced the Standard Profit Formula. 68 This formula allowed a designated
five percent profit return from every policy underwritten. 69 Such a guar-
anteed profit was considered fair and reasonable, because it helped protect
the insurer in case the premium was too low. 70 Furthermore, the NAIC
specifically provided that investment income should not be considered in
the setting of rates.
7'
THE FUTURE OF RATEMAKING
Investment income has become a larger portion of insurers' net worth
in recent years. It would appear that the need for a guaranteed margin
of profit from underwriting has declined. Indeed, the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners assembled a task force on profitability and
investment in 1982 to study the possibility of reflecting investment income
in the ratemaking formula. 72 In an advisory report to the NAIC task
force, advisory committee members J. Robert Hunter and John W. Wilson
supported the use of investment income in setting rates, stating that the
"time had clearly come for the insurance industry regulators to explicitly
64. See, e.g., IND. INS. LAWS § 27-1-22-1 (1986). For court decisions upholding such standards, see
J. MINTEL, supra note 34, at 147.
65. "In today's economy, traditional underwriting profit allowances, coupled with investment
income, would produce returns that greatly exceed the industry's cost of capital." J. WIsoN &
J. HUNTER, INVESTMENT INCOME AND PROFITABILITY IN PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE RATE-
MAKING (1983).
66. See Jewell, Insurer's Investment Income and Profitability, 24 FOR. DEF., July 1982, at 24, 25.
67. See id. at 25.
68. See id. (at that time, the NAIC was the National Convention of Insurance Commissioners).
69. See Jewell, supra note 66, at 25.
70. See Strazewski, Include Investments in Ratemaking: NAIC Panel, Bus. Ins., Jan.30, 1984, at 1,
col. 2.




include investment income in the ratemaking and approval process. '" 3
They also belived that "both the underwriting practices of insurance
companies and the recent dramatic increases in the level of investment
income, to the point where it greatly exceeds the level of underwriting
income, clearly demonstrate that the '1921 Standard Profit Formula' is
no longer relevant."
4
The NAIC task force agreed with Hunter and Wilson. The draft
from the task force concluded that regulator-approved rates that guarantee
an underwriting profit in addition to investment income lead only to
excessive insurance company profits. 75 Furthermore, such profits go be-
yond the legitimate interest in preserving the insurer's financial solvency.
76
State courts have held that, subject to the particular wording and
intent of their statutes, state insurance commissioners have the power to
consider investment income in the ratemaking process. 77 The insurance
industry has rejected such a derivation from the traditional rate regulation.
Insurance lobbyists argue that no reason exists to alter the 1921 Standard
Profit Formula. The Insurance Services Office, the industry's rate and
policy advisory organization, claims there is no evidence of excessive
profits when underwriting losses are considered. 71 Insurance officials also
argue that competition, and not theoretical models estimating investment
income, should set insurance rates.
79
The Debate Over Investment Income
A major disagreement about requiring ratemaking to reflect returns
from investment income centers on how it should be accomplished.
Insurers claim that there is no practical way to include investment returns
in setting premiums.8 0 The NAIC task force was even cautioned by
73. J. WILSON & J. HUNTER, supra note 65, at 169 (minority report).
74. R. CADDY, LEGISLATIVE TRENDS IN INSURANCE REGULATION 170 (1986).
75. See Strazewski, supra note 70, at 1.
76. See id.
77. Because of the construction of their ratemaking statutes, Virginia and Oklahoma allow the
insurance commissioner to consider investment income. See Virginia State AFL-CIO v. Com-
monwealth of Virginia, 209 Va. 776, 167 S.E.2d 322 (1969); Oklahoma State AFL-CIO v. State
Board for Property and Casualty Insurance Rates, 463 P.2d 693 (Okla. 1977).
78. See Strazewski, Industry Officials Criticize NAIC Report on Ratemaking, Bus. Ins., Mar. 12,
1984, at 2, col. 3 (statement of Mavis A. Walters, Senior Vice President of the Insurance
Services Office).
79. The insurance marketplace proves to be a better measure of rate adequacy for individual insurers
than any financial ratemaking model applied to the industry as a whole. See id. at 72. Insurers
also point out that the natural market competition already forces investment income to be
considered in setting rates. See id. at 2.
80. See McHugh, The Real Issue: State Versus Federal Or Regulation Versus Competition?, in
INSURANCE, GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIAL POLICY: STUDIES IN INSURANCE REGULATION 193, 207 (S.
Kimball & H. Denenberg eds. 1969). Indeed, it has been difficult for critics of the insurance
industry to counter the industry's argument, because most insurance companies keep financial
data under wraps. Insurance accounting, ratemaking techniques, measures of profitability,
reserving practices and underwriting evaluations always have confused the public. The insurance
industry does little to dispel this mistrust by refusing to follow Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles. See Strazewski, supra note 78, at 72. The GAAP are designed to allow companies
in all types of industries to report on a uniform basis. Insurance industry officials refuse to do
so, claiming that it would be an unappropriate reporting basis for ratemaking purposes. See id.
1987]
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insurance commissioners themselves that both they and the property-
casualty insurers lacked the experience necessary to determine the most
reasonable regulatory approach.8'
The NAIC report produced two possible methods to estimate insurers'
investment income for purposes of setting rates. The first is the risk-free
rate of return.8 2 The rate of return is indexed to the yield of an acceptable
risk-free investment instrument, such as U.S. Treasury Bills. Such a
valuation, however, is susceptible to several drawbacks that could result
in a significant underestimation of the actual returns. Generally, only a
small percentage of insurance company investments are committed to such
risk-free securities.83 Indexing also insulates the estimated investment return
from rapid changes in interest rates, which greatly affect the actual yields
on investments.
Consequently, the NAIC has proposed another alternative method,
an "actual rate of return" model." This model takes into consideration
the actual anticipated net investment income, likely capital gains and the
insurer's ratio of assets to net worth. The task force felt that this would
more accurately reflect the income expected to be received, because it
takes into account the various investments used and the company's ex-
pected returns.
The insurance industry believes that other methods of estimating
investment income would be more accurate. Insurers advocate estimates
based on a previous-year average of returns or a likely range of return. 5
The basic difference between the various models is that the task force's
models use actual expected income, rather than the insurer supported past
history models, which would tend to result in underestimations of invest-
ment income. Judicially, different courts express different attitudes on
whether investment income should be used and what method should be
followed in calculating the profit allowance with investment income.86
81. See R. CADDY, supra note 74, at 169.
82. See Strazewski, supra note 70, at 71.
83. See INSURANCE INFORMATION INsrTrurE, supra note 2, at 23 (in 1984, only 19% of insurance
company (investments were in government bonds).
84. See Strazewski, supra note 70, at 1.
85. See id. at 71.
86. In Attorney General v. Commissioner of Insurance, 370 Mass. 791, 353 N.E. 745 (1976), the
Massachusetts insurance commissioner argued that the Standard Profit Formula was the "shod-
diest component of ratemaking" and substituted a capital assets pricing model. 353 N.E.2d at
760. Under that model, the commissioner determines the target rate of return from the premium
and then calculates the estimated after-tax return on capital using a minimum reasonable
investment yield. The profit allowance is then adjusted so that the total return calculated in the
after-tax return equals the target rate of return. The Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld the
capital assets pricing model and noted that, although initial imprecision was acceptable, future
estimates would be subject to higher standards of accuracy. Id. at 813-15.
Three years later, the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected the North Carolina Insurance
Commissioner's use of the capital assets pricing model. State ex rel. Commissioner of Insurance
v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.E.2d 381, 269 S.E.2d 547 (1980). The court ruled the
use of the model erroneous as a matter of law, and arbitrary and capricious. 269 S.E.2d at
589-90. Consideration of investment income is not allowed under North Carolina insurance law.
Further, calculations made according to risk-free investments are inapplicable because such
investments are outside the scope of authorized investments under North Carolina insurance
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What is painfully evident is the confusion surrounding the investment
income of insurance companies. Not only is there disagreement between
insurers and their policyholders, but also between the NAIC task force
report and some insurance commissioners. Insurers resist having their
profit allowance reduced by investment income. They claim such income
is already reflected in their premium pricing, because of competitive
pressures. Consumer advocates believe that if investment returns were
expressly set against the traditional guaranteed profit margin, premium
levels would decrease. When some state insurance commissioners have
tried to implement such ratemaking plans, they have been thwarted by
their states' statutes and legislative histories.
THE NEED FOR FEDERAL REGULATION
The purpose of regulation is to protect the public interest and keep
the insurance industry responsive to current public needs and current
realities. 87 The conflict caused by investment income rate setting demon-
strates that a single uniform treatment of the problem must be promul-
gated. In order to effectively and efficiently do this, the "permanence"
of state regulation must succumb to the "relevance" of federal regulation.
Congress inevitably will consider proposed solutions to the insurance
crisis. In all likelihood, these proposals will focus on regulation, some
calling for more, others calling for less. Such potential legislation should
be accompanied by Congress' complete reassessment of present insurance
regulation focused on four questions:
1. How effective has state regulation been? In light of the recent
problems of affordability and availability, it appears the states have failed
to effectively regulate the price of insurance.
2. To what extent is the McCarran-Ferguson antitrust exemption
needed today? The McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed to allow concerted
price-setting through state regulated bureaus. Insurers themselves recently
have demonstrated a more independent and competitive approach, alle-
viating the need for special anticompetitive exemptions.
3. Is there a need for a new role by the federal government in
insurance regulation? The various treatments accorded by the states to
the setting of rates and investment income demonstrates the unreasonable
differences that can result without more uniform laws.
4. If there is a need for federal regulation, how could it be imple-
mented? Using the present framework of the state insurance departments,
Congress could devise a federal board of insurance commissioners to
law.
The North Carolina Supreme Court specifically refused to follow the Massachusetts decision
in Attorney General v. Commissioner of Insurance and distinguished the Massachusetts case on
several grounds.
87. See Stewart, Ritual and Reality in Insurance Regulation, in Insurance, Government, and Social
Policy: Studies in Insurance Regulation 22, 32 (S. Kimball & H. Denenberg eds. 1969). Regulation
has been defined as "the process of bringing current values of society to bear on current
practices of an essential industry; hence, regulation must seek relevance more than permanence."
See id. at 32 (statement of Richard E. Stewart, former New York Insurance Commissioner).
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coordinate the activities of the individual state agencies. Further, by
providing the Federal Trade Commission with authority over insurance
companies, a continued exchange of data between insurers (essential to
determine anticipated losses) can be maintained while any efforts of price
fixing can be prevented.
CONCLUSION
The insurance crisis presents problems of affordability and availabilty
of insurance protection. Consumer advocates point to record levels of
investment income and blame the crisis on insurance companies. Insurance
companies point to record levels of underwriting losses and blame the
tort system and the legal profession.
The tension is unlikely to dissipate. Policyholders are always ready
to accept premium reductions for any reason and rarely accept increases,
even for good reasons. Some insureds used the competition wars of the
early 1980s to negotiate further decreases in their premiums. Now that
competition has eased and premiums have increased, policyholders believe
advantage is being taken of them.
The fundamental problem that emerges is how the business of insur-
ance is to be treated. The insurance industry's position is that it is divided
into two distinct branches, the underwriting business and the investment
business. 88 Therefore, only income related to their underwriting practices
should be considered in ratemaking. Conversely, consumer groups regard
the insurance business as a single, indivisible whole. 89 Any type of income
is attributed to the business as a whole, and no underwriting profit is
necessary if income from investment is adequate to compensate for the
underwriting risk.
The matter is complicated by the fact that each state takes its own
view. 90 The lack of uniformity among the state insurance codes and
regulations has achieved nothing more than to increase confusion in an
already mysterious industry. Regardless of the political infeasibility of
federal regulation in the face of the current trend away from government
regulation, Congress should work toward a uniform regulatory approach
that will serve the interest of the public, not the insurance industry.
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88. This argument has been presented successfully in court. See Commissioner of Insurance v. North
Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 446, 269 S.E.2d. 547, 587 (1980).
89. 269 S.E.2d at 587.
90. North Carolina, for example, according to its own legislative history and its own insurance
regulations, clearly recognizes the dichotomy between the underwriting and investment activities.
See id.
* B.A., University of Notre Dame, 1984; J.D., Notre Dame Law School, 1987.
[Vol. 14:191
